Abstract Donna Haraway's recent volume, Manifestly Haraway, offers the opportunity not only to compare two of her most influential writings side-by-side but also to revisit some of the enduring themes of her work over the past several decades. In this interview with Haraway, feminist science studies scholar Sarah Franklin explores some of the key terms in her work, looking back to some of her early work on embryology and primatology as well as exploring the more recent themes of her latest book, Staying with the Trouble.
Introduction
Donna Haraway is one of the most prolific and influential theorists of the 20th century whose many publications have reached an increasingly global audience since the turn of the millennium. Her unique voice has become ever more urgent and necessary during a period when the intersections between social inequality, environmental decline, mass extinction events and increasing economic stratification have required boldly creative responses. Two long-awaited publications in 2016 underline the powerful contribution Haraway's scholarship continues to make to the effort to articulate a comprehensive politics of more viable world-making in the name of a mutually survivable future. This interview took place in August 2016 shortly after the publication of Manifestly Haraway (Minnesota, 2016) , a book that brings together two of Haraway's most significant essays with an interview by the series editor, Cary Wolfe, and just before the publication of Haraway's newest monograph, Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene (Duke, 2016) . In her interview, Sarah Franklin, a long-time reader and admirer of Haraway's work, explores some of the core themes, key terms, and definitive writing practices that have enabled audiences from a wide range of backgrounds to draw inspiration from the form as well as the content of Haraway's work.
Sarah Franklin: Okay. So the first term that I wanted to ask you about comes from the series title. This book is published in the post-humanities series, and you have said in the past that you have some reservations about 'post-human'. 1 So could you just say a little bit about that term and why it is and isn't useful? Donna Haraway: 'Post-human', I think, is not useful at all, because it colloquially means enhanced space race and post-space race type human, the kind of human who goes off-planet for a final human trajectory. It's fundamentally a teleological term, the word 'post-human'. 'Posthumanism' is another matter altogether. And clearly, 'post-humanism' has a wholly different meaning for the word. The prefix 'post-' is a kind of marking of an examination and an inquiry into the histories, and meanings, and possibilities, and violences, and hopefulnesses of humanism, which has a terribly complicated history. And I don't feel, by any means, comprehensively critical of 'post-humanism'. How could I? It's been a term that's collected up so much rich work.
That said, I'm not comfortable with the term, except as a kind of acknowledgement of collegiality and friendship and alliance with people for whom the term does a lot of work. And I greatly prefer the term that Rusten [Hogness, Haraway's partner] suggested, namely 'compost'. And for the term 'human' -it can, of course, etymologically, go a million (well, not a million!), but several sorts of ways. It can go toward 'homo-', and I choose to have that root word mean the kind of parabolic, tragic detumescence of the phallic character 'Homo' as fundamentally 'Man' who looks up and falls down in his tragic detumescence.
That root for 'homo-', I think, is a kind of . . . I use it to designate human exceptionalism, a kind of singularity of the human, fundamentally masculine, no matter the empirical accidents of people collected up into the category. It is fundamentally Euro, no matter the languages and ethnicities and colours of people collected up, and basically, it is a colonizing term in all of its resonances. I'm letting 'homo-' do that. By contrast one can take the human equally easily, and indeed, more easily, into the direction of humus, into the soil, into the multispecies, biotic and abiotic working of the Earth, the earthly ones, those who are in and of the Earth, and for the Earth. Humus is what is made in soils and in compost, for those who would nurture the Earth. So when I say 'compost', it's more than a joke, though it is also a joke. It's a refusal to be quite so serious about categories, and to let categories sit a bit lightly with the complexities of the world. But 'humus' is a term I'm very attached to, that we make with, and we become with each other, as in in compost. We are truly with.
That's why the word 'companion' was so important to me. It's a companioning with, in companion species. It's not about pets, though pets are also often companion species. But it's about companioning. It's about being in company with, being at table with. And in compost, we're at table with, including those who will return us to the Earth in our dying. I like the word 'compost' because it includes living and dying. If you're in compost, the questions of finitude and mortality are prominent, not in some kind of depressive or tragic way, but those who will return our flesh to the Earth are in the making of compost.
And that's not true, really, in post-humanism. You have to make it happen. 'Post-humanism' is so tied to theoretical discourses, terribly important ones. The making live and making die issues. The question of who is disposable, who counts. So much really important stuff has happened under the sign of post-humanism. But I think I just feel more comprehensively worked by and with compost. By the way, Rusten also suggested in a joke at breakfast that instead of human-ities we have the humus-ities.
SF: Yes, no, I love that -Humiversities! DH: Academia sounds very different if you bring it to humus. SF: Well, compost was further down my list, but since we're on the topic, it does seem a very rich idiom for many of the things that you've been writing about from the very beginning. It's a very earthy idiom. It's about unpredictable and predictable interactions. It's about life and death. It's about the symbiosis of the human with lots of other things. Clearly, it's what you might call a, kind of, quotidian ethicality. How people do compost. Do they do compost? Do they have a compost pile? You know, how do they feel about composting? DH: Well, you can do compost badly, which I also like. I like that about the term. You can neglect your compost. You can put the wrong things into it, you know, industrial (or, for that matter, organic) meat in it. You can fail to turn it over. You can put it in an inappropriate place so that it draws critters who shouldn't be drawn to compost, and whose lives then are themselves in danger from people, like raccoons, but who also endanger others. Compost is a place of working, a place of making and unmaking. And it can be a place of failure, including, well, culpable failure. Compost can be a place of doing badly. And I like that aspect of compost, having had some failed compost piles in my life! SF: Yes. So I was going to ask you that. Have you currently got a compost pile?
DH: Three, actually. One in this interesting black container with a lid that's supplied by the city, which is pretty much where our kitchen waste goes. We have a container, a ceramic container -actually, no, it's stainless steel. The ceramic one wasn't big enough. We have a stainless steel Franklin container on the sink, where things go on a temporary basis, and then they get walked out to the compost pile, which has a lid on it, and grass clippings and stuff go in there too. And then we have a couple of other piles that are just, like, tarpaper cylinders with holes poked in them, where more fibrous stuff goes. And we're not really good at keeping them all in, you know, state-of-the-art cooking compost conditions. We never get a high enough temperature. Also, we've got hens.
SF:
Your compost doesn't get hot enough.
DH: It doesn't get hot enough. And the chicken poop goes into the compost piles. And let's just say, if they've got any bad microbes in their shit, it's going to end up in our gardens, because it doesn't get out.
Yes. Because it's complicated, compost. In addition to the earthiness, the many piles of mixed ingredients, there's the fact that it can fail, which is another big theme in this book, the necessity of being proximate to failure. You called it an openness to relentless failing. And there are also questions of labour. Because certainly one reason a lot of people don't do compost is because they don't have time, or they don't have space, or they just don't like it. They don't want all that messy stuff right next to their sink.
DH:
And there is also the question of class -that we have a yard speaks to class. We own a house with a yard, wow! In a world with 20 million or so just flat out refugees, probably more than that, and more than 65 million people displaced from their homes, not to mention people with insecure housing of every imaginable kind, or no housing at all, on and on we go. I mean, to have a house with a big enough yard to have organic gardens and compost piles and hens speaks to class. Perhaps, in another generation in my own family, it might've spoken to being part of settler-colonial farming. Although, in my case, on my father's side, it would've spoken to slave-worked plantations.
In other words, I can't work my compost pile without being in the midst of the question of how to inherit the multiple histories and the multiple formations that allow this compost pile to be cooking badly in my yard, you know. They are provocations to becoming more historical, in the sense of bringing what you inherit into the present so as to somehow become more able to respond.
SF:
That's a very beautiful description. And I'm just going to ask you one more question about compost before we move on. Is there a division of labour in your house about the compost? DH: Yes. And it's a multispecies division of labour, of course, because the flies, and the worms, and the microbes, and the fungi do most of the work, and we try to provide a decent habitat for them. Chickens do a lot of the work because their poop goes into it, and so forth. And Rusten and I do a good bit of the work. And there's not much of a gender division of labour. Well, no, that's not true. Rusten turns it over more than I do. I add to it more than he does. We both work it. It's not exactly a gender division of labour, but there's a little bit of that.
SF: Yes, I think compost is a fascinating subject because there are so many elements of, you know, the politics of everyday life at work in questions around compost. And of course, the compost question has become much more prominent now that people are trying to exercise more responsibility about their domestic space and their domestic consumption.
DH: And I want to add one tiny, little thing. I don't think compost excludes cyborgian politics. It doesn't exclude cyborg entities at all. And if one defines, as I would, as I have always defined 'cyborg', in terms of specific historicities, it's not a synonym for machine. 'Cyborg' is not a synonym for robot. It's not a synonym for shiny, you know, shiny, metallic or something. It's rather, specifically, a cybernetic organism involved in the communication sciences and apparatuses that were provoked significantly by the corporate communications industries, like Bell Telephone, and the collaborations of World War II and the developments of the Cold War, in particular, its military and surveillance apparatuses. So I insist that cyborg be taken on in terms of those historicities, and while always exceeding those historicities, even at the beginning.
'Cyborg' includes 'compost' the same way it involves the kinds of worldings and becomings of the contemporary biological sciences, ecological sciences, for example. The way that I, and I think we, think about and interact with compost through the particular ways we understand molecular and biological processes, and microbiomes, and nutrition -all those things involve cyborg sciences fundamentally. Also, as I look out at my own compost piles, their materiality is cyborgian too -plastic surrounds one of my piles. The history of plastics is there. The particular structure of class and leisure enabled by the kind of economic system that I am part of. There's no way that these things are exclusive of what I mean by cyborg worldings. SF: Yes. Absolutely. Well, that opens up lots of directions we could go. But making a slight shift back to the theme of words you use, and how you use them, and your thoughts about that, probably the most important more recent word in this respect would be the 'Anthropocene', and your thinking about that term in relation to the 'Capitalocene'. Could you just say a little bit about those two terms? DH: Yes. 'Anthropocene' was proposed by a scientist who cared a great deal about the acidification and warming of the oceans, and the anthropogenic processes transforming life on Earth at its most Franklin fundamental levels. 2 If ever there was a cyborg term, it's 'Anthropocene'. If ever there was a cyborg knowledge apparatus that is capable of measuring and making strong knowledge claims on those kinds of scales, the Anthropocene is the embodiment of that kind of scale making.
The term bothers me on several levels, not least the sense that the anthropos is the centre of attention, yet again, and that the trajectory of destruction that ends in apocalypse, really, is, again, a story of the anthropos, a story of 'the one who looks up', which is one of the etymological meanings of 'anthropos', and is part of a story of man and mankind, that offers a fundamentally humanist way of naming the trouble we're in. It does, of course, correctly name the way that human beings are key agents -keystone agents, one might say -in the destructive processes entrained among us. But it does also and unhelpfully tend to universalize us as a species, and not situate us as human beings -or as a species. Homo sapiens sapiens, over the last many tens of thousands of years, are ill named. The anthropos is in trouble on that score because it tends to generalize to species.
These are some of the reasons I prefer 'Capitalocene'. If you could only have one word, then surely, the history of capitalism -with its imperatives to extract and grow, its relentless imperatives to expand itself -would be the better single name, if you wanted a single name. And that at least throws you back 500 years, say, if you're serious about the history of capitalism and its trading zones and extraction zones.
But I also want the term 'Plantationocene', partly because the history of the plantation is fundamental to the history of industrial capitalism, and the transportation of people and plants, and forced labour systems, and simplification of lifeways into monocropping, run by forced labour, whether it's wage labour or slave labour. But particularly, slave labour, and the transportation, the destruction of peoples in order to supplant them with other peoples under conditions of captivity. The forced migrations of organisms, including people, is the Plantationocene -and it's not over. The oil palm plantations today are probably the most prominent example, but also soy bean and corn.
The systems of plantation monocropping, and the forced labour of all the Earth, including the people, but also including the microbes, and the animals, and the other plants. The Plantationocene is far from over, and it's a fundamental axis to the Capitalocene. And I think those words name what's going on better than 'Anthropocene'. Also, I need the term 'Chthulucene', that I spell like 'chthonic', C-H-T-H. The chthonic ones, the entangled, ongoing, generative and destructive beings of the Earth. It's really almost a synonym for compost. Although, that's not quite true, But chthonic is tied to compost.
And Chthulucene is not Lovecraft's patriarchal Cthulhu monster thing. 3 It's not Lovecraft at all, but it's chthonic. The entangled forces and powers and entities of the Earth are not finished, and we are of them, and aligning ourselves, you know, for a situated flourishing which is present, not just past. These aren't just the Ancient Ones, though the chthonic ones are also ancient. It's rather about reaffirming ourselves as, in, of and for the Earth. So I like 'Chthulucene'. And '-cene', by the way, the suffix '-cene', means kainos, means now, a thick now, the recent times, the times of now. This now is not an instantaneous point. It's rather an expansive temporality of response-ability -the capability to respond. DH: Foreground, background, because the first one also included them both. It has a, kind of, a triple boundary breakdown or entanglementthe machine-animal, the machine-organism, the not-just-animal, but also microbe and plant. Machine organism, human animal, biotic, abioticall involved in the cyborgian reformulation of boundaries.
SF
But foreground, background. The 'Manifesto for Cyborgs ' [1985] foregrounded the techno entities -including cells and microbes, or cells and molecules, reconfigured as techno entities. Whereas, The Companion Species Manifesto [2003] didn't exclude that at all, but foregrounded the living critters in other kinds of relationships -including relationships of labour and play and sport and conquest, the dogs of conquest. It foregrounded human-critter relationships, particularly animal, otherwise than the Cyborg Manifesto did. So they're foreground, background moves.
SF:
One of the comments you made in the interview with Cary Wolfe that follows the pairing of these two manifestos side by side in your new book is that since you wrote The Companion Species Manifesto you have thought a lot more about what you might call the agriculture industrial complex, the large scale farming and animal production methods that determine the US food supply, as they do in many other developed countries. So can you say just a little bit about why that took greater prominence, in retrospect? DH: Right. I think it took a greater prominence because my friends and colleagues called me to account for not paying enough attention, and they called me to account on many levels. I had already been aware of industrial agriculture as a problem and so on and so forth. But I really hadn't paid adequate attention to the conditions of labour for animals You know, I think, Annie Potts is a profound thinker, and actor, and writer. 4 And people like Carol Adams [see Adams, 2016] , with whom I remain in a kind of allied friction, in Anna Tsing's sense [2011] . I think vegan feminists called me to account, and I had to pay attention that I was really not getting it! Really, no good. And then people like Jocelyn Porcher [2017] in France, who studies both animal husbandry, of a kind that I continue to affirm, and meat factories. She has worked with Vinciane Despret on some projects. You know, she has really searing ethnographic work on the pork production industry in North America.
And then students, especially Eric Stanley, a former student of mine, a deep thinker, a man who taught me to pay attention to forced life, not just forced death. And forced life both in the human prison context, but also in the animal factory context. Eric TA-ed with me and made me pay attention. So specific people made me pay attention, and think and feel.
So I think we're always in process on this. I now have a profound respect for veganism as a kind of witness, as a kind of No, a kind of loud No! as well as an affirmative politics. I am not a vegan, and I remain committed to sustainable animal agriculture for many reasons. The kinds of things Thelma Rowell does with her sheep are a good example. 5 And a politics that says, look, you know, pastoralists all over this planet have been subject to extraordinary state oppression, and corporate takeovers, and centralization, and on and on we go. And I am committed to the support of pastoralists' practices of situated kinds, and situated peoples. I think indigenous sovereignty politics are involved in quite a lot of these matters -hunting, for example, the Inuit of the Circumpolar North, and many more peoples.
I also am not willing to see the critters and peoples who have developed farming over hundreds and even thousands of years become nothing but museum specimens. I think the labour of making food is a good thing, and it involves killing and eating. So it's not about innocence, which has never drawn me . . . I am against pro-life politics, whether one is talking about abortion politics or the question of our relationship to working animals, because I think pro-life politics are exterminationist at their root. And that gets me in friction with many of my allies. And it's a moving issue. I don't know where I will come out. It's not a teleological process. But I do know the struggles have intensified for me.
Yes, that expression, 'forced life', has an interesting relation to the history of horticulture and farming and the plantation. It's a way of describing a relationship to the living in terms of what's necessary to organize the systems that are essential to organize production. I suppose you could say that's something that Marx didn't really pay so much attention to. He seemed to take the fertility of the soil a bit for granted. Whereas, in fact, reproducing that fertility has been crucial to industrial capitalism, as well as to agriculture. So what is the sense of forcing, for you, in forced life? Is it just control? DH: No. It's more than that. Because control is not always a bad term, for one thing. And I think control in agriculture, control in farming, control in raising a puppy, you know. I dare anyone to raise a wellmannered and happy puppy without engaging in practices of control, including controlling oneself! SF: Yes, I agree. [both laughing] DH: Anyhow, no, I actually think forced life, in the ways that I'm using it and that Eric taught me, and that I think you're using it [Franklin, 2013] , has to do with a kind of organization of all of the forces of generativity toward extraction and profit. It's about extraction for profit, and not living. It's not the organization of the forces of life and death for flourishing, but rather for extractive profit.
Yes. Which is what the plantation epitomizes, in a sense. The very integrated organization of life in such a way that extraction can be maximized.
DH: Exactly, especially through violent simplification. You know, when Anna Tsing and I taught one of our geo-feminism seminars together, and we read The Wide Sargasso Sea, 6 we spent time on some other things, too. We spent a lot of time talking about slave gardens in the Caribbean, and the importance of the slave gardens. They were, of course, for food and survival. They were also for beauty. And they were for a kind of autonomy. Autonomy is not quite the right word. A kind of coming to possess oneself in the slave gardens, to a degree anyway. They were places of growth and partial flourishing, partial resistance. The slave gardens, I think, have not gotten near enough attention in the history of plantations. They've gotten some, but I think there's a lot more room for understanding what still is to be inherited from the practice of slave gardens.
SF: Yes. Absolutely. Yes. Well, the slave garden brings us in a sense to the term 'reproduction'. I know that in your work 'reproduction' has sometimes meant, sort of, the same old, you know . . .
DH: Reproduction of the same.
SF: Yes, the tyranny of the same. As in 'Let's do symbiotic, lateral gene transfer -that's much more interesting than reproduction'! But at another level, reproduction has been really critical to your work, both reproduction as in narrative, and metanarrative -the myth of the Garden of Eden and all that. And in terms of labour, especially in the, sort of, old-fashioned socialist feminist idea of mode of reproduction being prior to and fundamental to productive work. You could say that a lot of your Franklin work is about the politics of reproduction, in one form or another, even compost, you know. So just tell me a little bit about your thoughts about that term, and how you use it.
DH: I can't use the term 'reproduction' without the term 'production'. Reproduction and production go together, and call up a complex historically-situated set of practices, worlding practices, world-making practices that necessarily involve the biological processes of bodies, and in particular, women's reproductive labour in its entire comprehensive sense of making lives, and of bringing lives to the possibility of their taking off and having lives of their own. Bringing children to mature adulthood is one of the meanings of 'reproduction'. And the importance of things like housing, and freedom to move, and the, you know, the conditions of joy that make lives possible.
All of that is involved in reproduction and in production. The kinds of labour in play, labour in . . . The kinds of generative expression in making. So production and reproduction are, of course, particularly, categories of this thing called the West. Marilyn Strathern and you are the key people for me, you know, in excavating the many ways that production and reproduction are Euro categories, which is not an insult [Strathern, 1980; Franklin, in press] . That doesn't make them bad or unusable. It situates them. They are Euro categories that were expanded into the world through colonialism primarily, through capitalism, and its apparatuses, and falsely universalized, as both you and Marilyn have insisted.
So the making persons that Marilyn in The Gender of the Gift [1988] and elsewhere worked so beautifully . . . She and her colleagues, who worked in Melanesia especially, have really foregrounded for us and made available for us whole kinds of world making and conceptual systems. Real practices as well, and including conceptual apparatuses, about the making of persons, and the difference between dividuals and individuals. Individuals are produced by reproduction. Dividuals are produced through other kinds of material exchanges in substance-making matters. All of that has felt fundamental to being an adult in the world, an adult feminist in the world.
And then my, really, bone-deep fury, and horror, and fear, and not being happy about there being 7.4 billion human beings on this planet right now. And if we're incredibly lucky, by the end of the century, wespecies, human -I don't know, whoever the 'we' is, there're likely to be well over 11 billion people -if we're lucky. If there is widespread global war, it will only make the numbers worse. Although it is an engine of suffering, disaster will not, does not, ultimately depopulate. Quite the opposite, actually, which is another horror. So I know why population is just a third-rail topic for feminists. The misogynism, the eugenics, the imperialism, the racism, the forced sterilization, the on and on we go. I know a lot about the history of population as a category in practice. I'm reading Alison Bashford's book, Global Population [2014] , and she knows a lot more than I do! I know all of this. And yet, somehow, all of these discussion do not make me let go of the category of population because I think we need it to do work, however problematic. Bashford's study is really deep, and she offers a non-aligned critical excavation of heavy, immense, folded and layered sedimentations of Malthusian apparatuses, of population apparatuses. That said, 7-plus billion is not just an abstract number. There's something about actually needing to figure out how to be . . . to notice as feminists, again, and as more than feminists, that we really truly are well more than 7 billion human beings on this planet.
And I don't care how distributed, and how just, and how anti-imperialist, we are trying to be about all of this. This matter is just immense, and far from over. And I think what characterizes our time, what, the last few decades and the upcoming decades, are getting at is that this is not just about the well-being of human beings. It's really about extinction crises and destruction crises. It's about ecological obliteration through turning all of the Earth into nothing but a resource for keeping human beings alive and growing. And I don't think feminists are talking about this, and it's really not okay. Obviously, the conversation has to remain tuned to its fraught histories and to the differential devastation wrought primarily (but not only) by the rich in wealthy regions, all of that.
SF: Yes, well, it's not, and as you say there's definitely room for a different set of conversations about population, about what the term even means. And I agree, there's really not a lot of space for that at the moment, and it's a very apt focus to bring forward. So speaking of bringing things forward, in addition to the Chthulian manifesto that I think is waiting inside you, or has been seeded, or is already coming into being, there's another one, which might even come before then, which is 'Make Kin Not Babies'. Is there going to be a Make Kin Not Babies manifesto? DH: Well, there's going to be a short, sharp, provocative paper written very soon! SF: Right. It's imminent then? DH: Yes, because Adele Clarke and I composed a panel at the 4S last November [2015] called 'Make Kin Not Babies'. And we were six thinkers, feminist thinkers together -Alondra Nelson, Kim TallBear, Chia-Ling Wu, Michelle Murphy, me, and Adele Clarke. Not all in agreement about everything (for example, Michelle Murphy and I are in a relation of generative friction over the category of population, which she thinks cannot be used anymore for what we need to do), but we share concerns under the label of 'make kin not babies'. Especially the making kin part, making kin other than genealogically. It's not like genealogical connection somehow becomes bad, and that family should just be tossed away in its various connections through genealogies. And again, you're one of my big teachers on the whole history of genealogy.
But making kin otherwise, making kin in both old and new ways. Making kin that endure, that cross over generations, over long times and short times. Making kin, otherwise, not babies, so as to be part of, over the next couple of hundred years, moving human numbers down, radically down. But radically down where environmental justice is a means and not just an end, so that we pay serious attention to multispecies flourishing, including issues of race and class and region for human beings, as means of making kin, not babies.
That's my political speculative fabulation. And feminist speculative fabulation has a deep feminist history; speculative fabulation in the feminist mode is powerful. Feminist SF must be tuned to making kin, exuberantly and creatively, not to making babies. Making babies, even rare and precious ones, is actually quite different to actually giving all babies half a chance to have a good childhood, which is, on the whole, not a priority anywhere these days. I'm actually terribly pro-child. I am seriously and strongly pro-child. And I think feminist politics have been leading, we've been leaders, I think, in understanding what it takes to be pro-child, and pro-growing up well, having, you know, seriously vibrant communities. I also think the immigration issues among us worldwide are fundamental to the project of making kin, not babies.
There are plenty of babies in the world. The eugenic nationalists just don't think that they're the right babies. So we now have eugenic nationalist pro-natalisms in Singapore, Taiwan, Denmark, so forth, on and on we go. SF: Yes, very true. And the future of those questions will link up with your Chthulian manifesto, so maybe they will together produce some interesting offspring.
DH: Who knows? I'm an old lady now, and I refuse to do that. You know, I refuse to do any more work! SF: Good luck with that one, Donna! So, Donna, I'm going to ask you one final question. And I just would like to start with the observation that so many of the things you've said about ethical responsiveness, about paying attention to labour, about, you know, the need to make new, sometimes, fragile and difficult kinds of affinity that may well fail. This is all very evident in your writing, at the level of citation, because one of the things that's very noticeable in both of the manifestos and in your interview in Manifestly Haraway, and now, as we're speaking, is the care and attention you give to other scholars. It's really quite remarkable.
And I wonder if you could just say a little bit about the way that informs your work, and the politics of that kind of responsibility and attention about writing and scholarship as they relate to these other questions? Because it seems to me that they do, and that one of the things you manifest is a kind of generosity, reaching out, listening to things that might be difficult, and engaging with things that change your mind, you know.
DH:
That makes me feel all . . . It makes me feel really good, for you to say that. I care about those things a lot. And I think I have a strong personality and a strong I. I'm also acutely aware in ways that make me feel more alive, not less, of how much that I is composed of we, and is an ongoing practice of, you know, profound pleasure in the ongoing nature of friendship, and political affinity, and family, and colleagueship, that it has been such a life-giving experience.
And so I do pay deliberate attention to citation. I have some little protocols I run through, you know, when I write a paper or give a talk, to try not . . . to try to make sure I haven't missed anything really big, or to at least, you know, to try to make clear to any readership or audience how much of a collaborative work any work is. I care about that a lot. And I do flat-out protocol things along several axes to make sure, and I'm terribly embarrassed when I screw up, and somebody writes me and says, you know, you used my painting, but I didn't hear my name. I don't like that at all . . . DH: It isn't that systematic, but there's a little list. I notice if I have cited nothing but white people, if I have erased indigenous people, if I forget non-human beings, etc. I notice on purpose. I notice if I haven't paid the slightest bit of attention . . . You know, I run through some old-fashioned, klutzy categories. Race, sex, class, region, sexuality, gender, species. I pay attention. I know how fraught all those categories are, but I think those categories still do important work. I have developed a, kind of, alert system, an internalized alert system. So when I went through my citation apparatus for Staying with the Trouble, I was aware that I had really been reshaped by a lot of indigenous sovereignty struggles going on right now, but had really been awfully mute about African American things, for example, in that the question of alliances around environmental justice hadn't gotten enough attention. And I tried . . . You know, it wasn't possible to fix it, but it was possible to cite it well enough to highlight the fact that the book doesn't do a good enough job. So I'm interested in the citation apparatus, not just noting what it does do, but showing what it just is pointing at, but really hasn't done.
SF:
Yes. Well, Donna, I just want to end this interview by thanking you for the two amazing manifestos that you've put in the book, and for describing the two forthcoming manifestos that I'm already looking forward to, and
